V-Model Role Engineering by unknown
Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
 
 
38
V-Model Role Engineering 
 
Radu CONSTANTINESCU 
Economic Informatics Department,  
Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania 
radu.constantinescu@ie.ase.ro  
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Introduction 
Starting with the opening brought by the 
distributed computing environments during 
the last decade, the security issues over 
passed the limited area of mainframe organi-
zations and became a widespread concern. 
Even more, the risks related to business area 
became more sharp and complex. The securi-
ty issues were institutionalized and standar-
dized. To obtain better results, the usage of 
security mechanisms must be done through a 
well defined organization process. 
The core of a security system is the way in 
which the access control is addressed. The 
most suitable access control model for ma-
ture organizations, with clear defined respon-
sibilities, is role based access control – RBAC 
[6], [7], [8], and [14]. Ideally, the implemen-
tation of an access control model is done 
concurrently with the informational system 
implementation. This case is less probable, 
because most organizations have already au-
tomated their business processes without tak-
ing in consideration access control as a man-
datory and also extended approach. A rigor-
ous analysis has to be done related to permis-
sions and roles assignment in order to im-
plement an access control system based on 
roles [1]. The model efficiency depends on 
the ability of the designers to identify the 
correct assignments. This desideratum can be 
obtained through the usage of a flexible me-
thodology which should sustain a coherent 
process of role engineering.  
 
2.  Problem Formulation 
The objective of this research is to identify a 
model aimed to address the security issues in 
an organization. In order to achieve this goal, 
this paper aims to define a methodology 
suited to identify the permissions and roles 
inside the information system of an organiza-
tion and to identify also the assignments be-
tween those two sets. The methodology 
should help the role hierarchy design and the 
identification of constraints. The results of 
the role engineering process will be used to 
design an authorization module for the in-
formation system implemented in a compa-
ny. Possible usage is presented by the author 
in [4]. 
Features of role engineering have been dis-
cussed starting with Coyne’s paper in which 
are defined the main activities that should be 
addressed in this concern. Those activities 
are: role definition, roles hierarchy definition, 
constraint definition and the mapping be-
tween roles and permissions [2]. 
Neumann and Strembeck have documented 
an approach for role engineering based on 
scenarios [13]. In this model, each activity is 
described based on a set of scenarios and 
each scenario is then decomposed in a suite 
of steps. Each step is then mapped to several 
permissions. The approach has the disadvan-
tage that it requires a great effort in order to 
determine all the possible scenarios. 
Crook and Ince designed a conceptual 
framework for role engineering based on or-
ganizational structures. This approach helps 
1 Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
 
 
39
determining roles but is not a comprehensive 
one [3]. Epstein suggested another approach 
of adding additional layers in order to ease 
role engineering. The approach was detailed 
in both top-down and bottom-up manner. The 
model takes the presumption that the roles 
and permissions are already determined, so it 
doesn’t specify how those items will be de-
fined. Neither the role hierarchy nor con-
straints definition is documented [5]. 
Goncalves and Maranda have proposed a role 
engineering method based on UML in corre-
lation with system’s functions. Functions are 
a middle layer between roles and permis-
sions. A role can be mapped with several 
functions and each function will require 
access rights. The approach lacks non-
functional items [9]. 
 
3. Problem Solution 
3.1. General concepts 
The paper proposes an extended RBAC mod-
el, in order to enhance the role engineering 
process. The paper also proposes a process 
aimed to identify the relations between roles 
and permissions. The proposed model, 
VMRE-RBAC (V-Model Role Engineering 
RBAC), facilitates the decomposition of roles 
in permissions and then the testing of the re-
sults. The model is iterative. For every test-
ing stage a new optimization of results is 
made. Every decomposition stage will have a 
correspondent testing stage. The testing stage 
is concerned with validation and verification 
of the results. The engineering process is en-
hanced with a set of properties proposed in 
order to achieve simplicity, consistency and 
coherence in the model.  
The paper is based on RBAC model. The 
components of the initial RBAC model are: 
users, roles, permissions, and also the rela-
tions between those elements. The initial 
RBAC model is enhanced by adding role hie-
rarchies and constraints. The integrated 
RBAC96 model is defined by cumulating 
those issues. One of the advantages of 
RBAC96 model is that it implements the 
principles of least privilege, separation of du-
ty and administration and also data-
abstraction [12], [14].  
The role engineering is a compulsory stage 
for a RBAC implementation. VMRE-RBAC 
extends the standard RBAC model by adding 
some extra layers between roles and permis-
sions: profiles, tasks and steps. The roles are 
determined and defined starting from a well-
known set of roles given the specific organi-
zational structure. Those roles are associated 
with a set of goals which determines respon-
sibilities. Each responsibility is carried out 
through a specific profile. I suggest that pro-
files should be low layer roles in the final 
role hierarchy. Each profile is then decom-
posed in tasks and the tasks are decomposed 
in steps. Steps are assigned to different sets 
of permissions. The decomposition can be 
driven by role issues or functionality issues. 
After a first decomposition process, the re-
sults will be tested incrementally. Testing 
means both verification and validation for the 
entities on each layer. In order to ease this 
process, I propose a set of nine properties 
which include: equivalence, minimization, 
reuse, completeness, consistency and cohe-
rence. These properties are defined in order 
to obtain a simple, complete and non-
equivocal model. The validation is driven by 
scenarios and responsibilities. 
The model is presented both in a static and 
dynamic view. The model is flexible, new 
permissions, tasks, profiles and roles should 
be obtained in future iterations. Even new 
organizational responsibilities should be add-
ed to the existing roles by using profiles. The 
methodology contains all the steps needed 
for role engineering: identifying roles and 
permissions, mapping roles to permissions, 
identifying constraints and building role hie-
rarchies. 
As a start, I use the standardized RBAC96 re-
lation between permissions and roles in order 
to build roles as a superset of permissions. I 
suggest decomposing the mapping of roles 
and permissions in several mappings between 
several middle layers. I propose the usage of 
three middle layers between roles and per-
missions, which are: profiles, tasks and steps. 
Each of these layers will be treated indepen-
dently. The role engineering process consists 
in two main sub-processes. The first process Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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is focused on a way to decompose the roles 
in permissions using a top-down approach. 
The second process tests the results in a bot-
tom-up approach. The testing process is 
based on a couple of requirements formalized 
in nine properties. These features will be de-
scribed in detail.  
The roles are placed in the upper layer of 
VMRE-RBAC model. A role is determined in-
itially based on the work-profile of the com-
pany in which the model is applied. A role 
can be associated with several responsibili-
ties. Each major responsibility is associated 
with a specific profile. The proposed roles 
will be validated taking in account the goals 
of the activity which are elicited, defined and 
refined during the engineering process. Each 
user associated with a profile is responsible 
for a set of tasks specific to the organization. 
The validation of these tasks should be made 
by several test scenarios. The scenarios are 
designed as use-cases for the organization’s 
informational system. Each task can be inter-
preted as a set of multiple steps which are 
executed in a specific logical order. In the 
end, each step is related to a set of permis-
sions. The grouping of multiple steps in a 
task determines the mapping between a set of 
permissions and a task. If a task is shared by 
different profiles, it will be reused. The same 
principle applies also to permissions, steps 
and profiles. If there are steps that don’t re-
quire permissions for the moment, they will 
be labeled as unconstrained. It is possible 
that an unconstrained task becomes con-
strained due to policy changes. 
Before I continue to describe the model in 
depth, I consider that it is important to detail 
some concepts used in this methodology: 
goals and scenarios. The goals and the scena-
rios have complementary particularities [11]. 
The goals are abstract and declarative while 
scenarios are concrete, narrative and proce-
dural issues. Scenarios describe real situa-
tions by examples. Eliciting the goals and 
scenarios will enhance the testing stage of the 
model. Having the goals as a central issue 
will facilitate de design phase because the 
goals are familiar and well understood by all 
the persons that are involved in the design 
process. 
The goals can be hierarchically structured 
and are linked to different implementation 
scenarios. Hence, based on goals, the design 
team will be able to determine use-cases for 
the system. I consider as a very important is-
sue in the first phase to identify the goals re-
lated to each profile. Given the goals, the de-
sign team will be able to determine and vali-
date the tasks related to each profile.  
 
3.2.  RBAC Extended Model 
The standard items of RBAC model - users, 
roles and permissions - are also used in the 
proposed extension and in the corresponding 
methodology.  RBAC standard defines the 
mapping between roles and permissions, as 
depicted in Figure 1, but it doesn’t detail how 
this mapping is achieved. I aim to propose a 
role-engineering solution in this concern. 
 
 
P 
 
 
R 
 
 
Fig. 1. The relation between roles and per-
missions in NIST’s RBAC standard 
 
I will detail the relation between roles and 
permissions starting from the NIST’s stan-
dardized RBAC model: 
•  R – roles set 
•  P – permissions set 
•  PA  ⊆ P × R  many to many relation be-
tween permissions and roles 
The roles in an organization can be classified 
as functional or administrative. In the first in-
stance I suggest dealing with the first catego-
ry. Usually, the system’s users are already 
defined in an organization. The tasks of iden-
tifying roles and permissions should be 
shared by the system’s administrator, devel-
oping team and also the beneficiaries. The 
general model for VMRE-RBAC is presented 
in Figure 2. Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
 
 
41
 
Fig. 2. The general model of decomposition and testing VMRE-RBAC 
 
Starting from the classic RBAC96 model, I 
added three middle-layers which are: pro-
files, tasks and steps. Each decomposition 
stage has an equivalent testing stage. In order 
to formalize the model, I use the following 
notations: 
•  R – roles set 
•  Pf – profiles set 
•  Sc – tasks set 
•  Ps – steps set 
•  P – permissions set 
•  RPf ⊆ R × Pf – many to many relation be-
tween roles and profiles 
•  PfSc ⊆ Pf × Sc – many to many relation 
between profiles and tasks 
•  ScPs ⊆ Sc × Ps – many to many relation 
between tasks and steps 
•  PsP ⊆ Ps × P – many to many relation be-
tween steps and permissions 
An important goal of the paper is to elaborate 
a methodology which should optimize the 
process of mapping between roles and per-
missions. I suggest a series of operations that 
will help the role-engineering process: mi-
nimize the sets at every layer, reuse elements, 
verify if constraints are in place and verify 
the complete mapping between elements in 
adjacent sets. The testing and optimization 
criteria are formalized in nine properties. The 
properties deal both with the elements on the 
same layer and with the mappings between 
elements in adjacent layers. In other words, 
the properties apply both on elements and re-
lations. The properties I propose are: equiva-
lence, uniqueness, completeness, reused ele-
ment, minimum, consistency and coherence. 
Properties like equivalence, uniqueness, 
completeness or reused element are also dis-
cussed in former papers as [5]. 
As I already mentioned, it is desirable that 
the number of roles, profiles, tasks and steps 
used in relations to be minimal. Ideally, each 
element is unique, the designer eliminates 
any duplicate. Additionally, the uniqueness 
of each element means that there is no other 
element that is equivalent to it. The equiva-
lence can be demonstrated by comparing 
how sets of elements from a layer are 
mapped to elements on the upper layer. If 
there are equivalent elements, they should be 
minimized.  
The role engineer verifies that all the roles 
defined have at least a permission assigned to 
it. Also, each element on one layer should be 
mapped to at least one element on both adja-
cent layers. This is formalized in the com-
pleteness property. The role engineer also 
test the consistency of each role and profile, 
meaning that the final set of permissions de-
termined will sustain the achievement of all 
declared goals. The consistency of tasks is 
tested through scenarios.  
The identification of constraints is one of the 
most challenging tasks in the design. It is re-
quired that all the constraints are identified 
and tested. I propose the coherence property 
in this matter.  
I present a formal description of the nine 
properties using the following conventions: 
•  A – set of elements on one layer 
•  B – set of elements on the next layer 
•  ƒ:A→ B, ƒ(a)=b where a ∈ A and b ∈ B – 
basic mapping 
•  ƒ
-1:B→ A, ƒ
-1(b)=a where a ∈ A and b ∈ B 
–basic reverse mapping 
•  ƒ(a:A)→2
B – mapping between an element 
on layer A and a set of elements on layer B, 
included in the set of the parts of B. 
Define profiles 
Define tasks 
Define steps
Define permissions
Test steps
Test tasks
Test profiles 
Test roles  Define roles
Scenarios
GoalsInformatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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•  P – permission set 
•  O – goals set 
•  S – scenario set 
•  Cp – constraints catalog for permission 
layer 
•  Cr – constraints catalog for role layer 
•  Cpf – constraints catalog for profile layer 
 
Property 1: Equivalence 
Let: 
ƒ (ai:A) → Bk 
ƒ (aj:A) → Bl 
ai ≠  aj 
If Bk=Bl then element ai is equivalent with 
element aj in the set A; notation: ai ≈ aj 
 
Property 2: Permission equivalence 
Let: 
ƒ (ai:A)→ Pk 
ƒ (aj:A)→ Pl 
ai ≠  aj 
If Pk=Pl then element ai is permission equiv-
alent with element aj in the set A; notation: ai 
≈p aj 
 
Property 3: Uniqueness 
Let: 
a, ai ∈ A 
If ! a ≈ ai (∀) ai ∈ A-{a} then a is unique 
 
Property 4: Minimum 
Let: 
a, ai ∈ A 
ƒ (a:A)→ B 
ƒ (ai:A)→ Bi 
For (∀)ai equivalent, then a is the minimum 
between ai, B = ∪Bi 
 
Property 5: Reused element 
Let: 
ƒ (ai:A)→ Bk 
ƒ (aj:A)→ Bl 
If  b∈Bk  ∩ B l the elements ai and aj reuse 
element b 
 
Property 6: Completeness 
If ƒ:A→ B and ƒ
-1:B→ A are surjective then 
(A,B) is a complete relation 
 
Property 7: Consistency 
For (∀)s∈S, (∃) pf∈Pf ∧ sc1, ..., scn ∈ Sc(pf) 
that: 
 
 
Property 8: The coherence of constraints at 
permissions layer for the upper layers: 
For  (∀)c∈Cp  ∧  (∀)p∈P(c)  then for 
(∀)pf∈Pf(p)  ∧ ( ∀)r∈R(p), Valid(pf,c)=1 ∧ 
Valid(r,c)=1, where Valid: A× C p  →{0,1}, 
A=Pf∪R 
 
Property 9: The coherence of constraints as-
signed to profiles and roles layers for the 
permission layers: 
a)  For  (∀)c∈Cpf  ∧ ( ∀)pf∈Pf(c), (∀)p∈ 
P(pf) the following relation is achieved: Va-
lid(p,c)=1, where Valid: P× Cpf →{0,1} 
b)  For  (∀)  c∈Cr  ∧  (∀)r∈R(c),  (∀)p∈ 
P(r) the following relation is achieved: Va-
lid(p,c)=1, where Valid: P× Cr →{0,1} 
 
The equivalence property is applied to R, Pf, 
Sc and Ps layers. The equivalence between 
permissions is not included here because 
permissions represent the lowest layer of the 
hierarchy and hence the first property cannot 
be verified. Two sets on the same layer are 
equivalent if they have the same set of ele-
ments mapped on the next layer. In order to 
determine the equivalent permissions, one 
can sort the permissions catalog, given the 
fact that any permission is a tuple (operation, 
object). The operations can be generally de-
fined as elements of {C, R, U, D, E} set 
where C is create, R is read, U is update, D is 
delete and E is execute.  
The permissions equivalence has sense in the 
context of tasks, profiles and roles. The per-
missions-equivalent elements are not neces-
sary equivalent as property 1 states. Other-
wise, elements equivalent due to property 1 
are also permission equivalent. 
Uniqueness is a property that applies to all 
layers and verifies if two or more elements 
are equivalent. In this case, the designer 
should minimize and reuse a single element. 
To determine the minimum, one should re-
duce the equivalent elements. If I discuss the 
permission equivalent issue, the minimiza-
tion decision will be made by the role engi-Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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neering manager. The identification of reused 
elements is correlated with the determination 
of the minimum elements. If an element is 
used in more than one mapping with the fol-
lowing layer, the element is reused. 
Completeness is applied for R, Pf, Sc and Ps 
layers. A layer is considered complete if all 
the elements in that layer are associated with 
at least one element on the next layer and 
vice-versa. The completeness will be verified 
also in the context of the relations between 
roles and permissions and between profiles 
and permissions. This is important because if 
a permission is not mapped to a role then this 
means that the permission is useless and 
needs to be cleared or that the task mapped to 
that permission is not linked to a role which 
means that is a problem in the relation be-
tween profiles and roles. Otherwise, if a role 
is not linked to permission, it means that the 
role is useless and will not carry out any ac-
tivity in the system.  
Consistency applies both to the profiles and 
roles layer. Consistency verifies if the per-
mission set assigned to a profile/role will be 
enough in order to achieve the goals assigned 
to that profile/ role. The goals are realized by 
successive tasks described in scenarios. In 
order to verify the consistency, one could test 
each scenario from the scenario’s list. Hence, 
for each profile Pf there will be mapped a set 
of test scenarios. If the permissions assigned 
to that profile allow completing the test sce-
narios then the profile will be consistent. A 
set of profiles determines a role, so the prop-
erty can be applied then to the role layer. 
Coherence tests the constraints assigned to a 
layer in the context of upper or lower layers. 
For simplicity reasons, I will apply this prop-
erty only to the following layers: R, Pf and P. 
I suggested two approaches for coherence, 
given the mapping direction. Hence, for 
property 8, I start from constraints catalog 
defined at permission’s layer. For each con-
straint, the designer should test if the pro-
files/roles that are linked to the constraint are 
compliant with it. For example, a permission 
P1 associated with the role R1 through the 
task  Sc1 might damage a constraint for the 
permission  P2 assigned also to R1 through 
another task, say Sc2. 
Property 9 tests that each constrain defined at 
profile/role layer is propagated to the permis-
sion’s layer. For example, a profile/role 
might enforce a separation of duty constraint 
that contradicts with an affiliation constrain 
defined at the permission’s layer. 
In Table 1, I present a summary of the corre-
lation between the nine properties I have de-
fined and the model’s layers. 
 
Table 1. The correlation between properties and layers in VMRE-RBAC model 
  Role  Profile  Task  Step  Permission 
Equivalence (P1)  ×  ×  ×  ×   
Permission equivalence (P2)  ×  ×  ×    
Uniqueness (P3)  ×  ×  ×  ×  × 
Minimum (P4)  ×  ×  ×  ×  × 
Reused element (P5)  ×  ×  ×  ×  × 
Completeness (P6)  ×  ×  ×  ×  × 
Consistency (P7)  ×  ×  ×    
Coherence (P8)  ×  ×      
Coherence (P9)         × 
 
As I already stated, RBAC model has as a 
primary feature the many to many relation 
between roles and permissions. Through 
VMRE-RBAC, the RBAC model is extended 
with several middle layers. The association 
between layers is done by defining the fol-
lowing relations: roles with profiles (RPf), 
profiles with tasks (PfSc), tasks with steps 
(ScPs) and steps with permissions (PsP).  
Each association has specific goals and fea-
tures. The general process of role definition 
implies two major sub processes, which are 
role decomposition in permissions and test-
ing. The decomposition process contains the 
following steps: identify the initial roles and 
role constrains, identify the main responsibil-Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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ities and determine the candidate profiles and 
profile constrains, for each profile elicit the 
tasks and then define the steps, identify per-
missions and subsidiary constrains. The 
process is depicted in Figure 3. 
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Newroles identified
Identify the set of roles  Identify the main 
responsibilities and then 
create profiles 
Define RBAC 
model 
Test tasks and steps 
Determine tasks and the 
steps 
Identify permissions and 
constrains 
Test profiles  Test roles 
 
Fig. 3. The general model for VMRE-RBAC process 
 
The testing process involves the verification 
and validation for all the elements and rela-
tions defined in the decomposition stage. Ve-
rification means the process of evaluation 
applied to elements and relations in which 
the results are confronted with the require-
ments and conditions defined by the designer 
for the system. In the verification stage will 
be used several properties that are already 
presented in the paper, e.g. P1 – P6, P8, P9. 
On the other hand, validation assures that the 
process is defining the right system. This im-
plies that the designers should confront the 
results with the beneficiaries. Also, valida-
tion implies that the model should be tested 
in relation with the goals and the scenarios 
elicited. Property 7 helps in this matter. If 
there are issues raised in the testing stage, 
then they will be addressed recurrently by 
running again items from the first main sub 
process. 
In Figure 4, I present a possible result of 
VMRE-RBAC process. For simplicity goals, I 
started with a single role R1 which has two 
profiles Pf1 and Pf2. For each profile I identi-
fied the tasks assigned. In this particular case, 
the profiles have multiple tasks assigned 
from which Sc2 is shared. Also, there are 
several steps reused and each step implies at 
least permission. 
The following items are developed in the role 
engineering process: 
•  Roles catalog: starting from an initial set of 
candidates which is updated and modified in 
the future stages. 
 
R1 
Pf1 
Pf2
Sc1 
Sc3 
Sc2 
Ps2
Ps1
Ps3
Ps4
Ps5
Ps6
Ps7 Ps8
P1 
P1 
P1 
P1
P1
P1 
P1 
P1  P1
 Fig. 4. Decomposition of roles in permissions 
 
•  Profiles catalog: includes the profiles eli-
cited based on the major responsibilities. In 
the final stage, the profiles will be included 
in the roles catalog as hierarchically lower 
roles. Hence, the profile catalog will be a 
subset of the role catalog. 
•  Task catalog: list of all the tasks defined in 
the role-engineering process and the items 
mapped to them both in higher and lower 
layers. 
•  Constrains catalog: list of constrains, clas-Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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sified in permission and role constrains 
•  Goal catalog: list of goals determined with 
the beneficiaries in order to validate the pro-
files and roles. 
•  Scenario catalog: list of scenarios elicited 
with the beneficiaries in order to validate 
tasks. 
•  RBAC model: role hierarchy, permissions’ 
set and the constraints applied. 
 
3.3.  Constraints design 
Defining right and comprehensive constrains 
for access control represents an important 
stage in role-engineering. Any omission or 
wrong rule can determine a security breach 
for the system. Determining constrains might 
be a difficult task as the finishing line is hard 
to acknowledge. Generally speaking, there 
are five major constraint classes: authentica-
tion constraints, contextual constraints, usage 
constraints, privacy constraints and security 
constraints. 
Defining constraints involves the proper 
identification of the conditions in which a 
subject is authorized to take an action on an 
object. In order to identify constraints, one 
could use the system requirements defined in 
the 1st stage of the development life cycle for 
the informational system. A constraint can be 
found after words like: „when”, „if”, „while”, 
„before” or „after”. The constraints can be 
also verified on agreed work scenarios. 
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Fig. 5. Constraint determination process in VMRE-RBAC model 
 
Figure 5 depicts the process for constraints 
engineering. The process involves the analy-
sis on all the constraints types in an iterative 
manner, starting from role constraints, con-
tinuing with profile constraints and finishing 
with permission constraints. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
The necessity of this paper is given by the 
complexity of the engineering process and 
the lack of a standardized way for performing 
role engineering. The paper grounds a consis-
tent approach for role engineering. The me-
thodology includes a decomposition process, 
from roles to permissions, and also introduc-
es extra-layers in the RBAC standard model.  
I identified a couple of future research areas 
to enhance VMRE-RBAC model. A first area 
of research is to introduce obligations in the 
model. An obligation is a task that has to be 
done when access is granted. VMRE-RBAC 
doesn’t include also the concept of delega-
tion which is used in the business activity. 
This issue can be another goal for the future 
research. An interesting research topic can be 
the development of a software product for 
role engineering based on VMRE-RBAC 
model or the development of specific dedi-
cated tools. The reverse approach, from per-
missions to roles can be implemented also 
starting from VMRE-RBAC model. 
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